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UNREASONABLE EXPECTATIONS: WHY 
PAlAZZOLO HAS NO RIGHT TO TURN A 
SILK PURSE INTO A SOW'S EAR 
PATRICK A. PARENTEAU* 
Abstract: Did the State of Rhode Island commit a regulatory taking 
when it denied Anthony Palazzolo the right to fill the salt marsh on his 
property? The answer suggested here is no. Under "background 
principles" of state property and nuisance law, in particular the public 
trust doctrine, owners of coastal property in Rhode Island have never 
enjoyed an unqualified right to fill tidal wetlands. In the absence of the 
express or implied permission of the state, no one has the right to fill, 
and thereby destroy, these important public trust resources. The 
remand of the Palazzolo case affords the Rhode Island courts an 
opportunity to clarify the scope and effect of the public trust doctrine 
and provide guidance for other state courts facing similar challenges. 
Coastal property may present such unique concerns for a fragile land sys-
tem that the State can go further in regulating its development and use 
than the common law of nuisance might permit.! 
INTRODUCTION 
Anthony Palazzolo is a frustrated man. For some time now he has 
been trying to fill the salt marsh on his coastal Rhode Island property, 
if for no other reason than that it is his, by God. But the State of 
Rhode Island keeps saying no. For Palazzolo, the last straw was the 
denial in 1986 of his latest application for a fill permit under Rhode 
Island's Coastal Resource Management law. Palazzolo claims that, in 
the immortal words of Justice Holmes, the State has gone "too far" 
and has taken his property for a public purpose without payment of 
just compensation, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution.2 
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. J.D., 1972, Creighton Univerity; LL.M., 1975, 
George Washington University. 
1 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy,J., concurring). 
2 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615-16 (2001); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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But what is it exactly that the State supposedly took from Palaz-
zolo? The property interest he claims is the right to fill eighteen acres 
of salt marsh on his twenty-acre parcel to create a "beach club," or 
maybe a subdivision (his exact plans are unclear). Regardless, the key 
question is whether Palazzolo ever had a right to dredge and fill in 
inter-tidal wetlands. Was that stick in the "bundle of rights" he got 
with the title he acquired in 1978? Mter reviewing "background prin-
ciples" of Rhode Island property and nuisance law, particularly the 
application of the public trust doctrine to tidal marshes, I conclude 
the answer is no; Palazzolo has not been deprived of any compensable 
interest. 
I. BACKGROUND: A LITTLE SALT MARSH ECOLOGY 
Why anyone would want to turn a salt marsh into a beach club is 
beyond me, since salt marshes are infinitely more interesting than 
beach clubs. Salt marshes are the crown jewels of the wetlands king-
dom. Acre for acre, salt marshes are among the most biologically pro-
ductive ecosystems on earth.3 They rival the richest agricultural land 
in terms of organic output, generated by the lush Spartina alterniflora 
grasses that grow there and nowhere else.4 The marsh is the biological 
membrane that connects the land with the sea, nurturing a rich diver-
sity of life forms-aquatic, terrestrial, marine, and freshwater spe-
cies-in a dynamic, complex mosaic of habitats that provide the struc-
ture, function, and composition necessary to insure the ecological 
integrity of this vibrant natural-and human-community.5 
The coast is a people magnet. From time out of mind, humans 
have been drawn to the shore to harvest the bounty of the sea; to 
build homes, businesses, and summer cottages; to engage in com-
merce and recreation; and to savor the beauty, power, and mystery of 
the ocean. One half of the American population live in coastal areas.6 
The natural values that make the seashore so attractive to people are 
5 See RALPH W. TINER, JR., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WETLANDS OF RHODE ISLAND 
59-60 (1989) [hereinafter WETLANDS OF RHODE isLAND] . 
4 See ROBERT H. CHABRECK, COASTAL MARSHES: ECOLOGY AND WILDLIFE MANAGE-
MENT 21-27 (1988). See gmerally JOHN lEAL & MILDRED TEAL, LIFE AND DEATH OF THE 
SALT MARSH (Ballantine Books 1991) (1969). 
5 See gmerally John M. Teal, Salt Marshes: They Offer Diversity of Habitat, 39 OCEANUS 13 
(1996). 
6 GEOFFREY S. BECKER ET AL., CONGo RESEARCH SERV., REPORT 97-588 ENR: OCEANS 
AND COASTAL RESOURCES: A BRIEFING BOOK, 23 (May 30, 1997), available at http:/ / 
www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/briefingbooks/oceans/a3.cfm. 
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sustained by the ecological processes that drive the system, and the 
salt marsh is a critical part of this system. Understanding what salt 
marshes do, what collective interests they serve, and what conse-
quences flow from their destruction, provides important clues to bal-
ancing the rights and responsibilities of property owners when 
conflicts arise over development within these areas. 
The list of good works, or "ecosystem services," that salt marshes 
perform for human communities is extensive. The marsh is a food 
factory, producing the detritus, or organic matter, that nourishes the 
complex web of life within the coastal ecosystem.7 The marsh is a 
nursery and refuge for a diverse array of fish and shellfish, producing 
the brood stocks that support commercial and recreational fisheries 
of enormous economic, nutritional, and cultural significance to the 
nation.8 The marsh acts as a filter helping to maintain the chemical, 
physical and biological integrity of coastal waters by removing pollut-
ants, recycling nutrients, and trapping sediments.9 It is a natural flood 
control mechanism, absorbing storm surges, slowing runoff, and re-
ducing erosion.1O It is a carbon sink, helping to regulate the climate 
by controlling the greenhouse gases that contribute to global warm-
ing. l1 Coastal marshes are the last refuge of many threatened and en-
dangered species of plants and animals.12 They are also great places to 
see birds of all kinds--ducks and geese, herons and egrets, willets and 
rails, hawks and ospreys-and to simply enjoy the sights, sounds and 
invigorating sea breezes. All of these benefits, and many others, are 
provided free of charge by nature's economy, the legacy of millions of 
years of evolution. No human labor produced these fruits and no 
government mandate created these benefits. They are part of the 
natural capital upon which this and future generations must draw for 
survival and prosperity. 
Which brings us to Mr. Palazzolo's marsh. His parcel is an inter-
connected piece of a much larger (146-acre) salt marsh associated 
7 See WETLANDS OF RHODE ISLAND, supra note 3, at 59-60. 
8 See id. 
9 See generaUy WETLANDS FUNCTIONS AND VALUES: THE STATE OF OUR UNDERSTANDING 
(P.E. Greeson et al. eds., 1979) [hereinafter WETLANDS FUNCTIONS AND VALUES]. 
10 See P.L. Knutson et al., Wave Damping in Spartina Alterniflora Marshes, 2 WETLANDS 87, 
87-104 (1982). 
11 See Robert M. Friedman & Calvin B. DeWitt, Wetlands as Carbon and Nutrient Reser-
voirs: A Spatial, Historica~ and Social Perspective, in WETLANDS FUNCTIONS AND VALUES, supra 
note 9, at 175-85. 
12 See William A. Niering, Endangered, Threatened, and Rare Wetland Plants and Animals of 
the Continental United States, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., May-June 1987, at 16-19. 
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with Winnapaug Pond, one of the great salt ponds that run the length 
of the Rhode Island coastline like a string of pearls. Salt ponds, or 
coastal lagoons, are shallow, productive estuarine embayments sepa-
rated from the ocean by coastal dunes and barrier spits. They provide 
prime habitat for commercial and recreational fish and shellfish, as 
well as resting and feeding stops for waterfowl, wading birds, and 
other wetland-dependent birds migrating along the Atlantic sea-
board}3 Rhode Island's salt ponds have been an important source of 
fish and shellfish from the time of the first human inhabitants. Ar-
chaeological evidence from the 1600s indicates the tremendous 
bounty yielded to native peoples that inhabited these areas and to the 
colonists who followed}4 Salt ponds have been and continue to be an 
important part of the cultural and economic life of coastal residents, a 
defining feature of this "bio-region." Salt ponds and salt marshes are 
an ecological unit, nested within a larger marine ecosystem. 
Winnapaug Pond is directly connected to Rhode Island Sound by 
an artificial canal called a "breachway." Some thirty-nine species of 
fish breed in the pond, including commercially valuable species such 
as blue fish and striped bass, as well as the forage fish on which many 
other species depend.15 The pond also produces shellfish including 
quahogs, soft-shell clams, mussels, and scallops, supporting a bur-
geoning aquaculture industry.16 The pond is a focal point for tourism, 
supporting numerous hotels, restaurants, and other businesses. It is a 
natural amenity that enhances the value of surrounding properties. 
Salt ponds are especially vulnerable to water quality problems 
related to the density of development. Salt pond watersheds are rela-
tively small; the Winnapaug Pond watershed is only 2000 acres. Bacte-
rial contamination and nutrient enrichment are the principal threats 
to water quality in estuaries in Rhode Island and nationwideP Septic 
systems, the most common form of sewage disposal in coastal com-
munities, chronically fail, especially in the mucky peat-like soils of the 
marsh, making them the leading source of bacteria and nitrogen 
IS See FRANCIS GOLET ET AL., R.I. DEP'T OF ENVTL. MGMT., SALT MARSH RESTORATION 
MONITORING AT THE GAULEE BIRD SANCTUARY, NARRAGANSETT, R.I. 17-19 (2000). 
14 VIRGINIA LEE, UNIV. OF R.I. COASTAL REs. CTR., AN ELUSIVE COMPROMISE: RHODE 
ISLAND COASTAL PONDS AND THEIR PEoPLE 22 (1980). 
15 State's Memorandum Regarding Remand at 37, Palazzolo V. State (No. 99-333-A). 
16 [d. 
17 See COASTAL REs. MGMT. COUNCIL, RHODE ISLAND's SALT POND REGION: A SPECIAL 
AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN 25 (1984). See generally U.S. REs. MGMT. COUNCIL, NATIONAL 
WATER QUAUTY INVENTORY: 1994 REPORT TO CONGRESS (1995). 
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loadings in coastal waters. IS Nitrogen is the essential nutrient in ma-
rine ecosystems, the fertilizer that drives the growth of phytoplank-
tons (algae). A little nitrogen is a good thing. Too much and you get 
runaway algal blooms, which deplete oxygen as they decay, causing 
eutrophication, and choking the life out of the salt pond.19 
Nitrogen creates other problems. As it mixes with groundwater it 
produces nitrates and nitrites. High levels of nitrates in drinking water 
can cause adverse health effects, particularly in infants, because it in-
terferes with oxygen supplies in the bloodstream ("blue baby" syn-
drome).2o Nitrates are highly mobile in groundwater, making them a 
threat to drinking water supplies in many communities. Under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA has set a "maximum contaminant level" 
of ten parts per million for nitrates.21 A number of coastal communi-
ties in Rhode Island already exceed that leve1.22 
II. WHO OWNS THE MARSH? 
It should be clear by now that development in coastal marshes 
poses particularly difficult environmental and public health problems 
that complicate the job of sorting out private and public rights. 
Coastal wetlands involve a complex mixture of land and water 
rights-private, common, and public. Simply declaring someone an 
"owner" without examining the use and proposed development of the 
property in relation to its surroundings and the rights of others is an 
empty exercise. Ownership does not carry with it the right to build 
anything anywhere. Property is a creation of law, not a divine right.23 
Property rights advocates often quote philosopher and legal scholar 
Jeremy Bentham's remark that "Property is the noblest triumph of 
18 See generally SCOTT W. NIXON ET AL., UNIV. OF R.I. GRADUATE SCH. OF OCEANOGRA-
PHY, NUTRIENT INPUTS TO RHODE ISLAND COASTAL LAGOONS AND SALT PONDS: FINAL RE-
PORT TO RHODE ISLAND STATEWIDE PLANNING (1982); Scott W. Nixon & Michael E.Q. 
Pilson, Nitrogen in Estuarine and Coastal Marine Ecosystems, in NITROGEN IN THE MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT 565-648 (Edward]. Carpenter & Douglas G. Capone eds., 1983). 
19 See Virginia Lee & Stephen Olsen, Eutrophication and Management Initiatives fM the 
Control of Nutrient Inputs to Rhode Islilnd Coastal Lagoons, 8 ESTUARIES 191, 191-202 (1985); 
Scott W. Nixon, Coastal Marine Eutrophication: A Definition, Social Causes, and Future Concerns, 
41 OPHELIA 199, 199-219 (1995). 
20 See COASTAL MGMT. REs. COUNCIL, RHODE ISLAND'S SALT POND REGION: A SPECIAL 
AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN (MAUSHAUG TO POINT JUDITH PONDS) ch. 1, at 6 (1999) [here-
inafter SALT POND S.A.M.P.]. 
21 40 C.F.R § 141.32 (e) (20) (2002). 
22 See generally SALT POND SAM.P., supra note 20, ch. 3. 
2~ See Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government: 
The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REv. 857, 863 n.16 (2000). 
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humanity over itself. "24 But Bentham also had this to say on the sub-
ject of property as a natural imprescriptible right: "Natural rights is 
simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical non-
sense, nonsense upon stilts. "25 For Bentham, founder of utilitarianism, 
the test of moral right lay in whether human action produced "happi-
ness or pain" for the community as a whole. 
Bentham's views are reflected in the thinking and writing of 
those who shaped the Constitution such as Thomas Jefferson who 
wrote: 
It is agreed by those who have seriously considered the sub-
ject, that no individual has, of natural right, a separate prop-
erty in an acre of land, for instance. By an universal law, in-
deed, whatever, whether fixed or movable, belongs to all 
men equally and in common, is the property for the mo-
ment of him who occupies it; but when he relinquishes the 
occupation, the property goes with it. Stable ownership is the 
gift of social law, and is given late in the progress of society.26 
Similarly, Benjamin Franklin observed: 
[T] he public has the right to regulate descents, and all other 
conveyances of property, and even of limiting the quantity 
and uses of it .... But all property superfluous to [that which 
is necessary for an individual's subsistence] ... is the prop-
erty of the public, who by their laws, have created it, and who 
may therefore by other laws dispose of it, whenever the wel-
fare of the public shall demand such disposition.27 
And finally, it was Thomas Paine who wrote: "Man did not make the 
earth, and, though he had a natural right to occupy it, he had no right 
to locate as his property in perpetuity any part of it; neither did the 
Creator of the earth open a land-office, from whence the first title-
24 See generally TOM BETHEll, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY 
THROUGH THE AGES (1998). 
25 JEREMY BENTHAM, Nonsense Upon Stilts, reprinted in THE COllECTED WORKS OF JER-
EMY BENTHAM: RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM 330 (Philip Schofield et aI. eds., 
2002). 
26 Letter from ThomasJefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE LIFE AND 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 576 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 
1993). 
27 WIllIAM B. SCOTT, IN PuRSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PRoP-
ERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 21-22 (1977). 
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deeds should issue. "28 In short, neither property nor the police power 
involves an absolute right. Each must be examined in the context of a 
specific place and time. That inquiry follows. 
III. PALAZZOLO'S LEGAL JOURNEY: A LONG AND WINDING ROAD 
The saga begins with the acquisition of the property in 1959 by 
Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI), a closely-held corporation controlled by 
Anthony Palazzolo (Palazzolo).29 Mter a series of unsuccessful efforts 
to develop the property in the 1960s, SGI let it sit idle for more than a 
decade while two important events occurred. First, in 1971, Rhode 
Island enacted coastal zone management legislation, creating the 
Coastal Resource Management Council (CRMC).30 The CRMC 
adopted the Coastal Resources Management Plan (CRMP), which in-
cluded regulations designating salt marshes, like those on SGI's prop-
erty, as protected "coastal wetlands," on which development was to be 
strictly limited.31 Second, in 1978, SGI's corporate charter was revoked 
for nonpayment of taxes, and title to SGI's property passed by opera-
tion of Rhode Island state law to Palazzolo personally as SGI's sole 
shareholder.32 
In 1983, Palazzolo resumed his efforts to develop the property. 
However, his application to build a bulkhead along the shore of Win-
napaug Pond and to fill the entire marsh, with no stated purpose, was 
denied by the CRMC on the basis that it would have significant envi-
ronmental impacts and conflicted with the CRMP.33 In 1985, he tried 
again, with a somewhat scaled down proposal to fill eleven acres and 
build a gravel parking lot and private beach club, consisting of a few 
picnic tables, barbecue grills, and portable toilets.34 The Council de-
nied this application in 1986 on the ground that Palazzolo had failed 
to make the regulatory showing of a "compelling public need" to jus-
tify a special exception to the ban on filling coastal wetlands.35 
Palazzolo then filed an inverse condemnation action in state 
court, claiming the State's wetland regulations, as applied to his par-
cel, had taken his property without compensation in violation of the 
28 Thomas Paine, AgrarianJustice, in THE PIONEERS OF LAND REFORM 184 (1920). 
29 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613 (2001). 
wId. at 614. 
~1 Id. 
~2 Id. 
~~ Id. at 614-15. 
MId. at 615. 
~5 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615. 
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The suit asserted that the regula-
tions deprived him of "all economically beneficial use" of his property, 
resulting in a total taking requiring compensation under Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal CounciL36 He sought damages of $3.1 million 
based on an appraisal of the value of a hypothetical seventy-four-Iot 
subdivision. The trial court ruled against Palazzolo on several 
grounds, including that the proposed filling and subdivision devel-
opment would create a nuisance.37 On appeal, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, discussing three is-
sues: first, that the takings claim was not ripe because Palazzolo had 
not fully explored uses of the property that would involve less wetland 
filling; second, that Palazzolo had no right to challenge regulations 
that predated his 1978 acquisition of the property; and third, that the 
claimed deprivation of all economically beneficial use was contra-
dicted by the undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in develop-
ment value remaining on the upland portion ofthe property.38 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in part 
and affirmed in part.39 The Court first held that the federal takings 
claim was ripe on the ground that the CRMC had made it clear that 
no filling of the wetlands would be permitted, and it would have been 
futile for Palazzolo to pursue alternative proposals.40 Next, the Court 
held that Palazzolo's acquisition of title after the regulations' effective 
date did not automatically bar his takings claim.41 Finally, the Court 
upheld the Rhode Island Supreme Court's finding that Palazzolo had 
not been deprived of all economic use of the property, and thus, did 
not have a valid Lucas claim for a "categorical" taking, because the 
record established that a home valued at over $200,000 could be built 
on the upland portion of the property.42 Nevertheless, the Court de-
cided that Palazzolo was entitled to pursue a claim for a partial taking 
under Penn Central Transportation v. City of New Yln'k.43 Penn Central re-
quires an examination of three factors: (1) the extent to which the 
!16 Id. at 615-16; see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1016 n.7 (1992). 
~7 See Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, CA. No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at 
*6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex reL 
Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
sa Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001). 
~9 Id. at 632. 
40 Id. at 625-26. 
41 Id. at 630. 
42 Id. at 630-31. 
4~ Id. at 632 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978». 
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regulation has interfered with reasonable, investment-backed expecta-
tions; (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; and 
(3) the character of the government action.44 The Court remanded 
the case to the state courts for an analysis of these factors. 
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor made it clear that 
pre-existing regulations must be taken into account "under the rubric 
of investment-backed expectations in determining whether a com-
pensable taking has occurred."45 In this respect Justice O'Connor 
broke sharply with Justice Scalia, who argued in a concurrence that 
the existence of a pre-acquisition regulation was irrelevant: "In my 
view, the fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took 
title (other than a restriction forming part of the 'background princi-
ples of the State's law of property and nuisance') should have no bear-
ing upon the determination of whether the restriction is so substantial 
as to constitute a taking."46 Because the four dissenting Justices agreed 
with her, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion is controlling on this 
point.47 
On September 25, 2001, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued 
an order concluding that a remand to the superior court would be 
necessary to conduct a Penn Central analysis.48 The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court invited counsel for the parties to comment on four 
specific issues including "the relevance of the Public Trust Doctrine as 
described in Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State,49 to the rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations of plaintiff Palazzolo. "so 
IV. THE "LOGICALLY ANTECEDENT INQUIRY": DID PALAZZOLO HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO FILL THE MARSH IN THE FIRST PLACE? 
Did Palazzolo have the right to fill the marsh in the first place? 
Surprisingly, this fundamental question has never been squarely ad-
dressed in the twelve years that the Palazzolo case has been in the 
44 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
45 Pa/oz.zolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
46 [d. at 637 (Scalia,]., concurring) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003,1229 (1992» (citations omitted). 
47 See id. at 633 (O'Connor,]., concurring); id. at 643 n.6, 644-45 (Stevens,]., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part); id. 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer,jJ., dissenting); id. 
at 654-55 (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
48 Palazzolo v. State ex TeL Tavares, 785 A.2d 561,561 (RI. 2001) (order remanding the 
case to the superior court and directing counsel to submit further memoranda). 
49 657 A.2d 1038 (RI. 1995). 
50 Palazzolo v. State ex TeL Tavares, 785 A.2d at 561 (order remanding the case to the 
superior court and directing counsel to submit further memoranda). 
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courts. Justice Stevens noted it in his dissent in Palazzolo v. Rhode Is-
land, but concluded that, for purposes of reviewing the threshold ju-
risdictional issues of ripeness and claim bar, the Court must assume 
that Palazzolo had the right to fill "at some point in the not-too-
distant past."51 However, if the right to fill was not in Palazzolo's bun-
dle of rights to begin with, then nothing was taken by the CRMC's de-
nial of the permit in 1986, even if the denial had resulted in a total 
''wipeout. "52 The Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council fur-
ther explained that such severe limitations "cannot be newly legislated 
or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, 
in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of 
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. "53 
Whether these "background principles" must derive from com-
mon law or can also be found in statutory law has been the subject of 
considerable debate in the post-Lucas cases and commentary. Accord-
ingly, the following discussion considers both possibilities with regard 
to the application of the doctrines of public trust and nuisance as they 
have been incorporated into the laws and judicial decisions of Rhode 
Island. 
V. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A BACKGROUND PRINCIPLE 
The public trust doctrine has its roots in Roman law, which rec-
ognized that all persons were entitled to the use of natural resources 
including the air, flowing water, the sea, and the seashore.54 The Ro-
mans sought to protect public uses for fishing, navigation, shellfish, 
seaweed collection, bathing, conservation, and aesthetics. The English 
adopted the Roman concept by defining the public trust to encom-
pass all lands beneath the tidewaters.55 The English brought this con-
cept to the Colonies, and it was incorporated into early American ju-
risprudence.56 
51 533 U.S. 606,640 (2001) (Stevens,j., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
52 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1027 (1992) ("Where the State seeks to 
sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may 
resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's 
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with."). 
5S Id. at 1029. 
54 j. INST. 11.1.1. 
55 Matthew Hale, A Treatise De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, in A HISTORY OF THE 
FORESHORE AND THE LAw RELATING THERETO 370-413 (Stuart A. Moore ed., Wm. W. 
Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1993) (1888). 
56 See Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Titk to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 
STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 247, 254-55 (1996). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has played a major role in defining the 
geographic scope, content, and legal effect of the public trust doc-
trine.57 In Shively v. Bowlby, the Court held that the State of Oregon, 
and not a pre-statehood grantee, held title to riparian land at the 
mouth of the Columbia River that was below the high water mark: 
At common law, the title and dominion in lands flowed by 
the tide were in the King for the benefit of the nation .... 
Upon the American Revolution, these rights, charged with a 
like trust, were vested in the original States within their re-
spective borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the 
Constitution to the United States. 
The new States admitted into the Union since the adop-
tion of the Constitution have the same rights as the original 
States in the tide waters, and in the lands under them, within 
their respective jurisdictions.58 
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Court expanded the 
reach of the public trust doctrine to include all tidally-influenced wa-
ters regardless of whether they are navigable.59 At issue in Phillips was 
the ownership of land-and the oil and gas deposits-underlying a 
number of bayous and streams associated with the Jourdan River in 
southwestern Mississippi. The Court found that the Jourdan, a navi-
gable tributary flowing into the Gulf of Mexico, was subject to the 
"ebb and flow" of the tide.60 Phillips Petroleum claimed exclusive 
rights under a title traceable to the Spanish land grants, but the State 
of Mississippi claimed it had acquired a public trust interest in the 
lands when it entered the Union. Phillips Petroleum argued that the 
public trust doctrine was limited to tidelands under navigable waters. 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that "even where tide-
lands are privately held [,] ... public rights to use the tidelands for the 
purposes of fishing, hunting, bathing, etc., have long been recog-
nized."61 The Court further stated that "[l]imiting the public trust 
57 See Virginia S. Albrecht & Deidre G. Duncan, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Naviga-
tional Servitude as "Background Principles, H in INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RElATED 
GoVERNMENT LIABIU1Y, 403, 405-07 (A.L.I.-A.BA COURSE OF STUDY, May 3, 2001), avail-
able in Westlaw, SF64 ALI-ABA 403. 
58 152 U.S. 1,57 (1894). 
59 484 U.S. 469,479-80 (1988). 
60 [d. at 472. 
61 [d. at 483 n.12. 
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doctrine to only tidelands under navigable waters might well result in 
a loss to the public of some of these traditional privileges. "62 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that title to the lands in question passed to the 
State when it entered the Union under the "equal footing" doctrine 
and were now part of the corpus of the public trust.63 Importantly, 
however, the Court qualified its holding by stating that it was up to the 
individual states to "define the limits of the lands held in public trust 
and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit. ''64 
The broad reach of this holding was underscored by Justice 
O'Connor in dissent, who noted that "[a]lthough there is no way to 
predict exactly how much land will be affected by the Court's deci-
sion, the magnitude of the problem is suggested by the fact that more 
than 9 million acres have been classified as fresh or saline coastal wet-
lands."65 Justice O'Connor went on to say, "To the extent that the con-
veyances to private parties purported to include public trust lands, the 
States may strike them down, if state law permits. ''66 
VI. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN RHODE ISLAND 
Rhode Island has recognized the English common law public 
trust doctrine since the colonial era.67 In Greater Providence Chamber of 
Commerce v. State, the Rhode Island Supreme Court succinctly re-
capped this history: 
The principle espoused by the English common-law public 
trust jurisprudence recognizes the unique resource that tidal 
waters constitute and the necessity that they be held by the 
sovereign in a trustee capacity for the use and benefit of all 
citizens. Thus these lands below the high-water mark will not 
be appropriated by, or conferred upon, private individuals 
for purely private benefit. It is this principle that forms the 
foundation of the public-trust doctrine in Rhode Island as 
well as in the other states.68 
62Id. 
65 Id. at 484-85. 
64 Id. at 475. 
65 Phillips Petroleum, 484 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
66 Id. 
67 See generally Dennis W. Nixon, Evolution of Public and Private Rights to Rhode Island's 
Shore, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 313 (1990). 
68 657 A.2d 1038, 1042 (R.I. 1995). 
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The Rhode Island Constitution, originally adopted in 1843, in-
corporates the customary right of the public to enjoy the "privileges 
of the shore," as follows: 
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all 
the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to which 
they have been heretofore entitled under the charter and 
usages of this state, including but not limited to fishing from 
the shore, the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to 
swim in the sea and passage along the shore; and they shall 
be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of the 
natural resources of the state with due regard for the preser-
vation of their values; and it shall be the duty of the general 
assembly to provide for the conservation of the air, land, wa-
ter, plant, animal, mineral and other natural resources of the 
state, and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to 
protect the natural environment of the people of the state by 
providing adequate resource planning for the control and 
regulation of the use of the natural resources of the state 
and for the preservation, regeneration and restoration of the 
natural environment of the state.69 
From its earliest decisions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
recognized that the State holds legal title to the soil under tide waters 
in trust for the public.70 At the same time, the court has also recog-
nized a qualified common law right to "wharf-out" in order to gain 
access to navigable waters, as long as the construction did not inter-
fere with navigation or the rights of other riparian landowners.7I 
Thus, Rhode Island law recognizes both jus publicum and jus pri-
vatum rights in tidal waters. The case law clearly shows that the jus pri-
69 RI. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1843). 
70 Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 166 (RI. 1895) ('The state holds the legal fee of all lands 
below high-water mark .... "); Gerhard v. Seekonk River Bridge Co., 5 A. 199, 200 (RI. 
1886) ('"Title to the soil under tide-water is in the state .... "); Baileyv. Burges, 11 RI. 330, 
331 (1876) ("In this state, at common law, the fee of the soil in tide waters below high wa-
ter-mark is in the state."); see Engs v. Peckham, 11 R.I. 210, 223-25 (1875). 
71 Nugent ex reL Collins v. Vallone, 161 A.2d 802, 805 (RI. 1960); see Providence Steam-
Engine Co. v. Providence & Stonington S.S. Co., 12 RI. 348, 363 (1879) (Potter,j., concur-
ring) ("In this State it has always been understood that the riparian owner has the right to 
wharf or embank against his land, and so make land from tide-water, and this without li-
cense, provided he does not interfere with the navigation."); see also Clark v. Peckham, 10 
RI. 35, 38 (1871). 
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vatum component is a qualified right requiring the express or implied 
permission-or at the very least the acquiescence--ofthe state.72 
The common law right to wharf-out has also been limited by 
various statutes over the years. One of the earliest was the 1896 Har-
bor Commissioners Act,73 which created a board of harbor commis-
sioners to "protect and develop the rights and interests of the state in 
such harbors and public waters. "74 Among other things this law 
authorized the commissioners to "regulate the depositing of mud, 
dirt, and other substances in the public tide-waters of the state, and 
[to] prescribe the places where the same may be deposited. "75 Any 
person wishing to build a wharf or fill tidelands was required to "give 
written notice to the harbor commissioners of the work they intend to 
do, and submit plans of any proposed wharf or other structure and of 
the flats to be filled. "76 Much of the coastal filling that has occurred in 
Rhode Island was done under harbor lines authorized by the commis-
sioners or by the legislature. 
Maintaining public access to navigation has not been the only 
concern of the courts and the legislature in Rhode Island. Conserva-
tion of fish and shellfish has long been an important element of the 
public trust in coastal wetlands.77 As the critical role of coastal 
marshes in the productivity of fisheries became better understood, the 
72 Nugent, 161 A.2d at 805 ("assent [by those exercising a regulatory authority] to [a] 
proposed pier was sufficient, as far as the state was concerned"); Dawson v. Broome, 53 A. 
151, 157 (RI. 1902) (filling accomplished "under leave of the state"); Walsh v. Hopkins, 48 
A. 390, 391 (RI. 1901) (filling "by sufferance and not by right"); Brown v. Goddard, 13 RI. 
76, 81 (1879) (although a riparian landowner had no title to the tide-flowed land he did 
have a "potential title by virtue of his right to fill out under leave of the State"); Bailey, 11 
RI. at 331 ("It is true the riparian proprietor may fill out in front of his land, but, if he 
does so, he fills out by the permission or acquiescence of the state .... "). As the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court clearly stated in Carr v. Cmpenter, 
The state may not give up its right to control the private rights, as well as the 
public ones, but it may suffer the littoral proprietor to acquire as against all 
the world but itself these private rights which naturally fall to him as the first 
appropriator, so that he becomes by the common law of the state the owner 
of these rights, with the exclusive power to exercise them as long as this does 
not interfere with the public rights of which the state reserves control. 
48 A. 805, 805-06 (RI. 1901). 
75 RI. GEN. LAws §§ 3-5, 10-12, 14 (1896) (current version at RI. GEN. LAws 
§§ 46-1-2, 46-6-1 to 46-6-6 (2001) (RI. GEN. LAws § 46-6-5 repealed 2002). 
74 See RI. GEN. LAws § 10 (1896), quoted in Dawson, 53 A. at 155. 
75Id. § 11. 
76Id. § 12. 
77 See Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 167 (RI. 1895) ("Shellfisheries are public rights which 
may be regulated for the public good .... "); State v. Cozzens, 2 RI. 561, 563-65 (1850). 
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General Assembly responded by enacting stronger regulatory pro-
grams, such as the Rhode Island Inter-Tidal Wetlands Protection Act 
of 1965, which restricted activities that would be detrimental to salt 
marshes, and imposed criminal sanctions on anyone who "dumps or 
deposits mud, dirt, or rubbish upon, or who excavates and disturbs 
the ecology of, intertidal salt marshes, or any part of one, without first 
obtaining a permit. "78 In 1971, the legislature went further, enacting 
the Coastal Resources Management Act of 1971, which led to the 
adoption of the Coastal Resources Management Plan (CRMP) in 
1976.79 Under the CRMP, filling of salt marshes is prohibited except 
where there is a compelling public need.80 
Unless and until they are extinguished by operation of law, public 
rights-the jus publicum-remain in force, and limit the rights that 
private parties acquire in public trust waters.81 In the Greater Providence 
case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decreed that the legislature 
could extinguish the public trust through a direct grant of tidelands, 
resulting in the owners acquiring fee title to the "reclaimed" lands.82 
The court also held that lands filled pursuant to established harbor 
lines would similarly extinguish the trust.8! Acknowledging that un-
certainty would still remain over the status of some filled lands, the 
court articulated the following test for determining when the public 
trust would be extinguished: 
A littoral owner who fills along his or her shore line, 
whether to a harbor line or otherwise, with the acquiescence 
or the express or implied approval of the state and improves 
upon the land in justifiable reliance on the approval, would 
be able to establish title to that land that is free and clear. 
The littoral owner may pursue a course of action seeking to 
convey the deed to that property to himself or herself and 
become the owner in fee-simple absolute provided that the lit-
toral owner has not created any interference with the public-
trust rights of fishery, commerce and navigation.84 
78 1965 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 26, § 1. 
79 Palazzolov. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614-15 (2001). 
80 Id. at 615. 
81 SeeIll. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,453 (1892). 
82 657 A.2d 1038, 1041 (R.I. 1995). 
8' Id. at 1044. 
84 Id. 
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Significantly, the court added this caveat: 'The state can, how-
ever, at any time, place restrictions on the filling in of shoreline pro-
vided it does so before a landowner has changed position in reliance 
on government permission. "85 In other words, littoral owners cannot 
"obtain preemptive rights against the state by adverse possession. "86 
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that the public 
trust doctrine has been a background principle of Rhode Island 
property law from its earliest days as an English colony, and that own-
ers of riparian and littoral lands have never had the absolute right to 
fill inter-tidal marshes. At most, they have enjoyed a qualified right-
more in the nature of a privilege-to wharf-out and fill with state 
permission or acquiescence. Though there was a period when the 
state policy towards filling was quite permissive, there was never a time 
when the State simply issued a blank check for filling. Statutes such as 
the 1896 Harbor Commissioners Act recognized the public trust as-
pects of coastal development and sought to regulate excessive filling, 
recognizing the harm that resulted from that activity.87 These regula-
tory programs became stricter over time. In the modern era, as the 
legislature began to understand just how crucial it was to preserve salt 
marshes in order to protect public trust rights, laws such as the 1965 
Act were passed. Ultimately, the legislature enacted the 1971 Coastal 
Resource Management Act, under which the 1976 CRMP was 
adopted. The CRMP made it clear that filling salt marshes would not 
be permitted except in cases of compelling public need. 
This raises the interesting question of whether, as far as Palaz-
zolo's claim is concerned, these more recent legislative enactments 
could themselves be considered background principles limiting the 
use of the property he acquired in 1978. In his majority opinion in 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Justice Kennedy noted that background prin-
ciples are not confined to common law doctrines, and specifically re-
served the question on remand of whether Rhode Island's coastal 
protection statutes could be considered background principles: "We 
have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a legis-
lative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state law 
or whether those circumstances are present here. "88 Moreover, Justice 
Scalia acknowledged in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council that 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 1044 n.2. 
87 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 3-5, 10-12, 14 (1896) (current version at R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 46-1-2, 46-6-1 to 46-6-6 (2001) (R.I. GEN. LAws § 46-6-5 repealed 2002). 
88 503 U.S. 606, 629 (2001). 
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where "[t]he use of these properties for what are now expressly pro-
hibited purposes was always unlawful, ... it was open to the State at 
any point to make the implication of those background principles of 
nuisance and property law explicit. "89 That would seem to be a fair 
description of what the Rhode Island General Assembly did when it 
enacted the Coastal Resource Management Act in 1971 in culmina-
tion of over two centuries of customs and laws dealing with protection 
of public rights in tidal waters. Because state law had always recog-
nized the superior rights of the public trust in tidal waters, it was open 
to the legislature to make explicit what had formerly been implicit, 
and to restrict uses that had formerly been liberally permitted but 
which, due to changing circumstances and new knowledge, it had be-
come necessary to prohibit. Once these uses were prohibited, future 
purchasers could no longer claim any rights or reasonable expecta-
tions to engage in them.90 
In sum, under the public trust doctrine as recognized in Rhode 
Island common law, constitutional law, case law, and statutory law, 
Palazzolo never had a cognizable property interest in filling the salt 
marsh, and thus his claim of deprivation under the Fifth Amendment 
must fai1.91 
VII. How OTHER STATES HAVE APPLIED THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE IN TAKINGS CASES 
In the landmark case of Just v. Marinette County, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court declared that the state has an "active public trust 
duty" to protect wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.92 In denying a 
takings claim based on a county wetlands protection ordinance, the 
court stated, "What makes this case different from most condemna-
tion or police power zoning cases is the interrelationship of the wet-
89 505 U.S. 1003,1030 (1992). 
90 See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 
2d 1226, 1255 (D. Nev. 1999) (landowners not entitled to engage in activity prohibited by 
regulation that pr~ated acquisition), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 
2000), afI'd, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 
1995) (post-acquisition landowner "never had the right to fill critical area tidelands"). 
91 See Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55-56 
(1986) (noting that the Constitution is not the source of property rights); Payne v. United 
States, 31 Fed. Cl. 709, 710-11 (1994) (finding no compensable interest in unpatented 
mining claim); Plantation Landing Resort, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 63, 67-69 
(1993) (finding no compensable interest in tidelands under Louisiana Code), afI'd, 39 
F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (table decision). 
92 201 N.w'2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972). 
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lands, the swamps and the natural environment of shorelands to the 
purity of the water and to such natural resources as navigation, 
fishing, and scenic beauty. ''93 In its most famous statement, the Just 
court said: "An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to 
change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a 
purpose for which it is unsuited in its natural state and which injures 
the rights of others. ''94 However, the Just case has not been followed by 
every state which has considered it.95 
The viability of the Just rationale has been called into question in 
the wake of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciL 96 Though it remains 
good law in Wisconsin97 and in Florida,98 the situation has changed in 
South Carolina. In Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Counci~ the South 
Carolina Supreme Court endorsed the Just rationale.99 However, in 
McQJteen v. South Carolina Coastal Counci~ the court concluded that 
Lucas implicitly overruled Carter. lOO Interestingly enough, the court 
then proceeded to hold that the owner lacked "investment-backed 
expectations" because he had acquired the property after the adop-
tion of wetlands regulation. lOl The U.S. Supreme Court granted certicr 
rari, and subsequently vacated and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island's conclusion that the 
93Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981); Rowe v. Town 
of North Hampton, 553 A.2d 1331, 1335 (N.H. 1989); Am. Dredging Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. 
Prot., 391 A.2d 1265, 1269-71 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978), aff'd. 404 A.2d 42 (NJ. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 n.10, 1083 (Wash. 1987). 
But see Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency, 580 A.2d 539, 545 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1990), cert. granted in part, 582 A.2d 205 (Conn. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 593 A.2d 1368 
(Conn. 1991); Statev.Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 714-16 (Me. 1970). 
96 See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1438-40 (1993). 
97 &eZealyv. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 534-35 (Wis. 1996). 
98 &e City of Riviera Beach v. Schillingburg, 659 So. 2d 1174, 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1995). 
99 314 S.E.2d 327,329 (S.C. 1984). 
100 350 S.E.2d 628, 632-33 (S.C. 2000), cert. granted and vacated sub nom. McQueen v. 
S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 314 S.E.2d 327 (2001) (remanding to the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina in light of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001». 
101 Id. at 634-35 (noting that owner's "prolonged neglect of the property and failure to 
seek developmental permits in the face of ever more stringent regulations demonstrate a 
distinct lack of investment-hacked expectations"). 
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mere existence of pre-acquisition regulations does not bar a takings 
claim, but must be considered as part of the Penn Central factors.102 
Orion Cmp. v. State illustrates how the public trust doctrine has 
been applied in tidal marshes on the West Coast.l03 The Orion Corpo-
ration planned to build a residential community on dredged and 
filled tidelands in Padilla Bay, but was blocked by a series of state 
coastal laws limiting such development. Orion claimed a taking. Mter 
determining that "title in and sovereignty over Washington's tidelands 
and shorelands vested in the state upon admission to the Union," the 
Washington Supreme Court applied the public trust doctrine to 
Orion's tidelands. 1M The court compared the public trust doctrine to 
a "covenant running with the land," stating that Orion "had no right 
to make any use of the its property that would substantially impair the 
public rights of navigation and fishing. "105 Ultimately, the court con-
cluded, "Orion never had the right to dredge and fill its tidelands, 
either for a residential community or farmlands. "106 
New Jersey took a slightly different path to the same result in 
Karam v. State. l07 In that case, a riparian owner purchased land on the 
Manaquan River and applied for a permit to build a dock. The permit 
was denied because the riparian land was designated a "special re-
stricted area" due to its importance to shellfish production. lOS The 
court cited Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois for the proposition 
that "ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered 
by tide waters ... belong to the respective states within which they are 
found. "109 The court held that although the sovereign has inherent 
authority to convey riparian grants to private parties, "the sovereign 
never waives its right to regulate the use of public trust property. "110 
The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have any legitimate, 
investment-backed expectations of construction rights in the marsh.1ll 
102 See Pa/m.zolo, 533 U.S. at 629-30 (2001); id. at 633 (O'Connor,J., concurring); id. at 
643 n.6, 644-45 (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, 
Souter & Breyer,D., dissenting); id. at 654-55 (Breyer,J., dissenting). 
105 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987). 
104 Id. at 1072. 
105Id. at 1072-73. 
106 Id. at 1073. 
107 705A2d 1221 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), affd, 723 A.2d 943 (NJ. 1999). 
108 Id. at 1223. 
109 Id. at 1228 (quoting Ill. Cent. RR Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,435 (1892» (first al-
teration in original). 
lIO Id. 
111 Id. at 1229. 
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The doctrine of custom, which is closely aligned with the public 
trust doctrine, was recognized as a background principle in the denial 
of a takings claim in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach. ll2 Stevens involved a 
suit by owners of beachfront property who sought to build a seawall 
on the dry sand portion of the beach. The permit was denied and the 
owner sued for inverse condemnation. The Oregon Supreme Court 
decided that the law of custom is a background principle of state law, 
and since the public had continuously used the beaches along the en-
tire coastline "from the time of the earliest settlement to the present 
day," the plaintiff had no right to build anywhere on the beach.1l3 The 
court specifically reserved the question of whether the public trust 
doctrine would be a background principle that would also bar a tak-
ings claim.114 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari over a dissent-
ing opinion by Justice Scalia.ll5 While acknowledging that the Consti-
tution leaves the law of real property to the states, Justice Scalia 
expressed doubts as to whether the requirements of custom had actu-
ally been met in the case.116 
The guarantee that the public shall enjoy the "privileges of the 
shore" embodied in Section Seventeen of Article I of the Rhode Is-
land Constitution is a manifestation of the customary uses that the 
public has made of tidal waters including fishing and clamming.1l7 To 
give effect to these public rights, the State, as trustee, must have the 
power to protect the corpus of the trust, which necessarily includes 
the salt marsh. Simply put, without salt marshes there would be no 
fish or clams for the public to enjoy. 
VIII. NUISANCE AS AN EVOLVING BACKGROUND PRINCIPLE 
By definition, property ownership does not include the right to 
create unlawful nuisances. us Under the "nuisance exception," the 
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that government is not re-
quired to compensate owners for restricting activities considered a 
112 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993). 
11$ [d. at 453, 456-57. 
114 [d. at 453 n.11. 
115 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994) (mem.) (Scalia & 
O'Connor,jJ., dissenting), denying cert. to 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), aff'g, 835 P.2d 940 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1992). 
116 [d. at 1335 n.4. 
117 SeeStatev. Cozzens, 2 R.1. 561, 563-65 (1850). 
lIS Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987). 
"[N]o individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise 
harm others." [d. at 492 n.20. 
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nuisance under state law.119 The Court has recognized that nuisance 
law is an evolving concept that expands as knowledge, needs, and so-
cial values change.120 As the California Court of Appeal observed in 
ruling that the filling in of San Francisco Bay had reached the point 
where it had become a public nuisance: 
In short, the police power, as such, is not confined within 
the narrow circumspection of precedents, resting upon past 
conditions which do not cover and control present day con-
ditions obviously calling for revised regulations to promote 
the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the public; 
that is to say as a commonwealth develops politically, eco-
nomically, and socially the police power likewise develops, 
within reason, to meet the changed and changing condi-
tions.121 
This expansive view of the nuisance exception was questioned in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council by Justice Scalia, who eschewed 
"noxious use logic" as a basis for justifying "newly legislated" limita-
tions on property.122 Justice Scalia criticized the "harm-benefit dichot-
omy," under which lower courts often seek to distinguish between 
compensable and non-compensable exercises of the police power by 
examining whether the regulation is harm-preventing or benefit-
conferring.123 Dismissing this as largely an exercise in semantics, Jus-
tice Scalia stated: "[T]he distinction between regulation that 'prevents 
harmful use' and that which 'confers benefits' is difficult, if not im-
possible, to discern .... "124 Though appearing to limit the takings 
exception to classic common law nuisances, Justice Scalia did concede 
that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was 
119 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (finding no taking in the 
case of a gravel mining ban); Mugler v. Kansas; 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) ("[A]lI property 
in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be 
injurious to the community."). 
120 See generaUy John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 
18 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1993). 
121 Candlestick Props., Inc. v. S.F. Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 
905 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (quoting Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 383 (Cal. 1925». 
122 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-29 (1992). 
m See ROBERT MELTZ, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., C.R.S. REpORT FOR CoNGRESS, 
RL30423: WETLANDS REGULATION AND THE LAw OF PROPERTY RIGHTS "TAKINGS," at 9-12 
(Feb. 17, 2000), available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/wetlands/wet-6.cfm#In-
vestmentHarm/benefit. 
124 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026. 
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previously permissible no longer so. "125 Further, he stated: "It seems to 
us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property 
to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted 
by the State in legitimate exercise of its police power .... "126 
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Lucas, went fur-
ther: 
The common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the 
exercise of regulatory power in a complex interdependent 
society .... The State should not be prevented from enacting 
new regulatory initiatives in response to changing condi-
tions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations 
whatever their source. The Takings Clause does not require 
a static body of state property law; it protects private expecta-
tions to ensure private investment.127 
The Lucas Court set out several tests, drawn from the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, for analyzing whether the nuisance exception should 
apply to a total taking: "[T]he degree of harm to public land and re-
sources, or adjacent private property, posed by claimant's proposed 
activities, ... the social value of the claimant's activities and their suit-
ability to the locality in question, ... and the relative ease with which 
the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the 
claimant and the government (or adjacent landowners) alike .... "128 
Applying these tests to Palazzolo's situation, it seems fairly obvious 
that the activity he proposes meets even Justice Scalia's narrow 
definition of a nuisance. 
First, as the state trial court judge found, Palazzolo's proposed 
filling will harm "public resources," such as fish, shellfish, and water 
quality, as well as public health: 
The CRMC introduced evidence that the filling of 18 acres 
of salt marsh would reduce the existing salt marsh in Winna-
paug Pond by 12 percent. In addition, the evidence showed 
that a 12 percent reduction in the salt marsh in Winnapaug 
Pond would cause a reduction in the commercial and rec-
reational shellfish and finfish populations in Rhode Island. 
125 Id. at lO3l. 
126 Id. at 1026. 
127 Id. at 1035 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
128 Id. at 1030-31 (citations omitted); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 826-28, 830 (1979). 
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Moreover, the evidence indicated that the 12 percent loss of 
the total salt marsh in the Winnapuag Pond will have a 
significant detrimental impact on the existing salt marsh 
filtering mechanisms within the pond which could be ex-
pected to result in increased harmful nitrate levels within the 
pond. The evidence illustrated that high levels of nitrate in 
groundwater poses a public health threat because ground 
water is the sole source of drinking water.129 
123 
Based on these findings, Judge Williams ruled that Palazzolo's 
proposal would constitute a public nuisance.130 This ruling is in line 
with prior Rhode Island cases. 
In Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Counci~ the owner of 
property abutting Winnapaug Pond was denied a permit to construct 
a summer home using an individual sewage disposal system because 
the council concluded that the system would result in "the introduc-
tion of nitrogens, nitrants [sic], and phosphates into the marsh in 
significant amounts."131 Noting that "[a]reas that were previously con-
sidered valueless wetlands are now recognized as important ecological 
resources," and that "[a]ctivities that have previously been considered 
harmless may come to be recognized as serious threats to the public 
well-being," the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the permit 
denial was a valid exercise of the police power to protect public health 
and safety.132 By contrast, in Annicelli v. Town of South Kingston, the 
court ruled that denial of a permit to build a single family dwelling on 
a barrier beach was a taking "for a public good" that deprived the 
owner of all economic use of the property.133 Although it recognized 
the ecological significance of barrier beaches, the court reasoned that 
"the police power may properly regulate the use of property only 
where uncontrolled use would be harmful to the public. "134 
These two cases illustrate nicely the harm-benefit dichotomy, but 
this approach to takings analysis may no longer be viable in light of 
the Justice Scalia's dictum in Lucas. However, where the harm caused 
129 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-0297,1997 WI.. 1526546, at *5 
(RI. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997); afl'd on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex reL Ta-
vares, 746 A.2d 707 (RI. 2000), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
1W ld. 
m 434 A.2d 266, 268 (RI. 1981) (quoting the CRMC's final decision). 
m ld. at 269. 
133 463 A.2d 133, 139-41 (RI. 1983). 
1M ld. at 141. 
124 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:101 
by the use of property rises to the level of a nuisance, it can still be 
prohibited without compensation. Activities that threaten public 
health, such as contamination of drinking water, would clearly qualify 
as nuisance. Activities that threaten ecological damage, on the other 
hand, have not always been seen as nuisance-like. 
In addition to creating a public nuisance, Palazzolo's proposal 
would harm adjacent private property by increasing erosion and 
flooding. In Lucas, Justice Scalia cited this kind of effect as an exam-
ple of nuisance-like activity: "[T]he owner of a lake-bed, for example, 
would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requi-
site permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the 
effect of flooding others' land. "135 Similarly, in Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, the Court pointed to the impact on other 
owners of land subsidence caused by coal mining as a justification for 
a state regulation requiring that coal pillars be left in place to provide 
support. 136 
Second, based on the record, there is little or no social value to 
the activity that Palazzolo proposes. He simply wishes to develop the 
property for private economic gain. In fact, he was denied the permit 
on the ground that he had provided no evidence of any public need 
or benefit from any of the various development schemes he had pro-
posed.m Further, the proposed filling is not "suitable for the locality 
of the subject property. "138 The salt marsh around Winnapaug Pond 
remains essentially intact. Development in this area has largely been 
confined to the uplands. There is no evidence to suggest that Palaz-
zolo has been singled out for disparate treatment by the State. 
Third, the harm here is easily avoided. All that Palazzolo has to 
do is leave the marsh alone. That would still leave him with the three 
essential attributes of ownership--the right to possess, to exclude 
135 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
136 480 U.S. at 491-92. "[T]he State hM not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power 
to enjoin the nuisance-like activity." Id. at 492 n.20; accord M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 
47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (coal company "never acquired the right to mine in 
such a way as to endanger the public health and safety"); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125-26 (1978) (where health, safety, or general welfare 
would be promoted by particular contemplated uses of land, compensation need not ac-
company prohibition). 
137 See Palazzolo v. RhodeIsland, 533 U.S. 606, 615 (2001). 
138 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-{)297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *5 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex rei. Ta-
vares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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others, and to dispose of the property.139 A prohibition on a single 
use-one "stick" in the full "bundle"-does not constitute a taking 
even where the use is not a nuisance.l40 
IX. WETLANDS FILLING AS NUISANCE-LIKE ACTIVITY 
Rhode Island has long considered the unpermitted filling of salt 
marshes to be a nuisance. The 1896 Harbor Commissioners Act pro-
vided that "[e]very erection made into or encroachment upon the 
public tide-waters of the state, not authorized by the General Assem-
bly or by the harbor commissioners, shall be deemed to be a public 
nuisance and shall be prosecuted by the attorney-general. "141 
Under Rhode Island law, a public nuisance is defined as an "un-
reasonable interference with a right common to the general public; it 
is behavior that unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, 
comfort or convenience of the general community. "142 Activities that 
damage shellfisheries have long been considered a public nuisance.l43 
Septic discharge into public waters is also recognized as a public nui-
sance. l44 
A number of other state courts have ruled that dredging and 
filling of wetlands are nuisance-like activities that can be regulated 
without running afoul of the Takings Clause. In Claridge v. New HamJr 
shire Wetlands Board, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that 
denial of a permit to fill tidal marshes was not a taking because filling 
the marsh would have "irreparably diminished the marsh's nutrient 
producing capability for coastal habitats and marine fisheries. "145 
While recognizing that plaintiffs bore a heavier burden than the pub-
lic at large, the court found that the burdens were not "unreasonably 
onerous" in light of the "risk which the [property owners] chose to 
take in buying this lot with notice of the regulatory impediments and 
in waiting to develop the property in the context of growing public 
concerns about wetland resources. "146 The court's reasoning is in-
structive: 
159 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
140 Andrusv. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). 
141 R.I. GEN. LAws § 14 (1896) (current version at RI. GEN. LAws § 46-6-3(2001». 
142 Citizens for Pres. of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53,59 (RI. 1980). 
145 &ePayne & Butlerv. Providence Gas Co., 77 A 145,151 (RI. 1910). 
144 &e Bd. of Purification of Waters v. City of East Providence, 133 A. 812, 814 (RI. 
1926). 
145 485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 1984). 
146 [d. 
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The dangers associated with filling wetlands have only re-
cently become widely known. However, the public policy of 
the State has recognized the importance of these wetlands, 
and strong regulations to protect wetlands have been en-
acted. The regulations call for some sacrifices from all, in 
that land otherwise ideally situated for private development 
is effectively rendered unavailable for that purpose.147 
In Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., the Florida Supreme Court 
held that the denial of a permit to destroy 1800 acres of mangrove 
swamp was a valid exercise of the police power, rather than a taking, 
because it was necessary to avoid "unreasonable pollution of the wa-
ters thereby causing attendant harm to the public. "148 The court ac-
knowledged the difficulty of drawing the line between prevention of a 
public harm and the creation of a public benefit, but reasoned that 
the restriction was simply "maintaining the status quo. "149 The court 
also noted that the developer "had only its own subjective expectation 
that the land could be developed in the manner it now proposes. "150 
In the case of In re Gazza v. New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation, the New York Supreme Court held that denial of a 
variance for construction on tidal wetlands was not a taking because 
the owner acquired the property two years after the regulation took 
effect. The court stated that "[t]he relevant property interests owned 
by the petitioner are defined by those State laws enacted and in effect 
at the time he took title and they are not dependent on the timing of 
State action pursuant to such state laws. "151 
However, the argument that filling wetlands can be prohibited as 
a nuisance-like activity has fared less well at the federal level. In Florida 
Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, which hears appeals of federal takings claims, ruled that 
denial of a dredge and fill permit under the Clean Water Act was a 
taking because filling wetlands-unlike putting toxic waste in drink-
ing water-caused no real harm and it was unfair to expect landown-
ers to maintain wetlands at their own expense.152 The United States 
Claims Court reached the same result in Loveladies Harbors, Inc. v. 
147Id. 
148 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981). 
149Id. at 1382. 
150 Id. at 1383. 
151 In re Gazza v. N.Y State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1040-41 
(N.Y 1997). 
152 791 F.2d 893, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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United States, holding that building houses on wetlands is not a harm-
ful activity.I53 
These ill-informed, unscientific views of some members of the 
federal judiciary should have no bearing on how the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court comes to view Palazzolo's situation. As Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council makes clear, it is up to state courts to define 
the nuisance law of the State. In Rhode Island, coastal wetlands have 
always been treated as unique areas where public rights limit private 
rights, and where the unpermitted filling of wetlands, as well as the 
resulting pollution of shellfish habitat, is considered a public nui-
sance. This being true, Rhode Island nuisance law provides another 
basis for concluding that Palazzolo never had a right to fill the marsh. 
X. APPLYING THE PENN CENTRAL FACTORS 
The foregoing discussion of background principles is also rele-
vant to the analysis of Palazzolo's claim under the three-part test for 
partial takings of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. In-
deed, it is often difficult to distinguish background principles from 
investment-backed expectations.154 In fact, the Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 
decision muddles the analysis even more by eliminating the bright 
line "notice rule," under which owners who took title after regulations 
were in effect were per se barred from asserting a takings claim. I55 
Palazzolo adds confusion because it is not clear from the Court's plu-
rality opinion (1) when a statute should be considered a background 
principle that effectively removes one or more sticks from the bundle 
of rights that subsequent owners acquire; (2) when it renders an 
owner's expectations unreasonable, thereby defeating a takings claim; 
or (3) when, if ever, it should be discounted altogether (e.g., in a total 
takings case). 
153 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388-89 (1988). 
154 See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nuisance of Takings Law, 3 WASH. U.J.L. 
& POL'y 149 (2000); R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings 
Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 449 (2001). 
155 See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Florida devel-
oper lacked reasonable expectation that he would be able to get wetland permits necessary 
to fully develop property). But see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 
(1987) ("Nor are the [property owners'] rights altered because they acquired the land well 
after the Commission had begun to implement its policy."); Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. 
United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reasonableness of owner's expecta-
tions is irrelevant to analysis of whether a regulation effects a categorical taking), afl'd on 
reh 'g, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000), reh'g en banc denied, 231 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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One of the first post-Palazzolo cases to address this problem was 
Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States.156 In Rith, a mining company claimed 
that coal-mining regulation under the federal Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) caused a ninety-one percent reduc-
tion in the amount of coal the company was able to remove.157 Both 
the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit denied the claim, ruling 
that because Rith was not denied all economic use or value there was 
no categorical taking, and further ruling that because Rith acquired 
the property after the SMCRA regulatory program was in place, Rith 
had no reasonable expectation that it could mine all the coal.158 Mter 
Palazzolo was decided, Rith moved for a re-hearing, arguing that the 
existence of regulations on the date of its acquisition was irrelevant, 
that it was "entitled to stand in the shoes of its predecessors who 
owned before SMCRA. "159 On rehearing the Federal Circuit rejected 
this argument: "In sum, our conclusion that reasonable investment-
backed expectations play an important role in regulatory takings cases 
is not inconsistent with anything in the Supreme Court's decisions in 
Nollan and Palazzolo. "160 The Rith court noted that the Supreme Court 
has consistently reaffirmed the importance of evaluating investment-
backed expectations in regulatory takings cases.161 
In Palazzolo's case, the conclusion that he lacked any reasonable 
investment-backed expectation seems inescapable, given the regula-
tory history of coastal wetlands protection in Rhode Island. Indeed, 
for the reasons already discussed, that history suggests that neither he 
nor his predecessors in title ever had an unqualified right to fill. But 
even if the Rhode Island courts rejected the public trust and nuisance 
doctrine as controlling background principles, they would have to 
factor them into an analysis of whether Palazzolo's expectations fol-
lowing his 1978 acquisition of the property were reasonable. The only 
logical conclusion is that coastal development was a highly regulated 
activity long before 1978, and that no one acquiring property in that 
156 270 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2660 (2002). 
157 Id. at 1349. 
156 Id.; seeRith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 115 (1999). 
159 Rith Energy, Inc. v, United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
122 S. Ct. 2660 (2002). 
160 Id. at 1351. 
161 Id. at 1350-51. In Rith, the Federal Circuit observed that "among the factors enti-
tled to 'particular significance' in regulatory takings analysis is the regulation's 'interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectations.'n Id. (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 
523 (1998». 
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time frame could reasonably expect to be handed a permit to fill salt 
marsh. 
The other Penn Central factors are no more availing to Palazzolo. 
In terms of diminution of value, the U.S. Supreme Court has already 
said that Palazzolo's parcel "retains significant worth for construction 
of a residence. "162 The record suggests that this residence is worth 
$200,000. That figure may change, up or down, as a result of further 
factual development on remand. But assuming it is in the ballpark, 
and even accepting Palazzolo's inflated estimate of the property's 
market value of $3.1 million, the alleged deprivation is roughly 
equivalent to the ninety-one percent reduction in value in the Bith 
case.163 It is also possible that the deprivation ultimately will be found 
to be substantially less than that. 
The key variable in calculating diminution is the so-called parcel-
as-a-whole, or "denominator," rule.164 Under this rule, the use and 
value of the entire parcel must be taken into account, not just the 
portion burdened by the regulation. As the Supreme Court said in 
Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension 
Trust "To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that por-
tion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is 
whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in 
question. "165 The Supreme Court refused to consider Palazzolo's ar-
gument that only the wetland portion of his parcel should be consid-
ered because the argument was being raised for the first time on ap-
peal.166 Should Palazzolo attempt to argue this point on remand, he 
will face a new obstacle in the form of the Supreme Court's latest tak-
ings decision, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency,167 discussed below. 
The Bith court summed up the analysis of the "diminution" factor 
this way: 
Although the regulatory action in this case caused a sub-
stantial diminution in the value of Rith's coal leases, it did 
not deprive Rith of its opportunity to make a profit on the 
leases; it simply reduced the margin of profit that Rith had 
162 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001). 
16~ See 270 F.3d at 1349. 
164 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. lO4, 130-31 (1978). 
I~ 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993). 
166 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631. 
167 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
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hoped to achieve. The record reflects that the coal that Rith 
was able to mine resulted in a substantial profit for its inves-
tors in light of the price paid for the coallease,168 
According to the record in Palazzolo, Palazzolo retains the ability 
to build a "substantial residence," worth about $200,000 on the small 
upland portion of the property.169 This would not be a bad return on 
his initial investment of $13,000.170 Although he is claiming $3.1 mil-
lion in damages for lost development potential, the Fifth Amendment 
protects "economically viable" uses, not the most profitable. l7l 
The final Penn Central factor is the character of the government 
action.172 There is considerable debate about what the Penn Central 
Court meant by this criterion and what weight it should be given. It 
appears that the Court was mainly concerned with whether the gov-
ernment action would result in a physical invasion of the subject 
property as opposed to a use restriction. Physical invasions, no matter 
how small, are categorical takings requiring automatic compensa-
tion.173 Use restrictions, on the other hand, require a more searching 
investigation of the facts and circumstances of each case, and a weigh-
ing of the benefits and burdens of regulations, with the ultimate test 
being whether the regulation singles out individuals for burdens that 
ought to, in fairness, be borne by society at large,174 
Beyond physical takings, however, it is not clear what the "charac-
ter" element of the Penn Central analysis is supposed to mean. In one 
sense, it should not matter what objective the government has in 
mind for restricting the use of property. Indeed, the legitimacy of the 
government action should not even be an issue in a "true" takings 
168 270 F.3d at 1352. 
169 Palm:zolo, 533 U.S. at 631. 
170 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *6 
(R.1. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997); a/I'd on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex reL Ta-
vares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.1. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
171 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Deltona Corp. v. United 
States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Allegria v. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249, 1253-54 (R.I. 
1997) (no taking where there was a fifty percent diminution in value); Annicelli v. Town of 
South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 140 (R.I. 1983) (finding that a ·property owner does not 
have a vested property right in maximizing the value of his property") . 
172 See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
m See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-28, 438 n.16 
(1982). 
174 SeeConnollyv. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223-24 (1986). 
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case.175 If there is a question about the legality of the government ac-
tion, that ought to be resolved in a separate proceeding leading to a 
different remedy than compensation,176 
Nevertheless, the lines do blur. In Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, for example, the Court held a regulation requiring beach-
front property owners to provide public access to the beach in ex-
change for a building permit was a taking because there was an in-
sufficient nexus between the means and the ends. In Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, the Court held that a requirement that a landowner dedicate a 
portion of her property as a buffer along a stream to control runoff 
would be a taking unless the state demonstrates a "rough proportion-
ality" between the required dedication (i.e. the size of the buffer) and 
the problem being addressed (i.e. the amount of runoff contributed 
by her development). Some commentators suggest that Nollan and 
Dolan are better understood as substantive due process cases)" The 
Court itself acknowledges the difficulty of drawing doctrinal lines be-
tween compensable takings and substantive due process violations.178 
In Palazzolo's case, the State of Rhode Island is exercising its po-
lice power to prevent a public nuisance that would cause irreparable 
harm to a public trust resource, create a potential public health 
threat, and interfere with other property owners use of common re-
sources like Winnapaug Pond. What Rhode Island seeks to do is simi-
lar to what the State of Pennsylvania was doing in the Keystone. The 
coal pillars that the State required to be left in place to support the 
land surface, and prevent subsidence that would threaten the 
175 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); NoIlan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. The Supreme Court in both 
Dolan and Nollan noted that a "land use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substan-
tiaIly advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'deny an owner economicaIly vi-
able use of his land." Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (emphasis 
added); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). The Agins Court first 
stated this test, but in the disjunctive. 447 U.S. at 260. 
176 John D. Echeverria, A Preliminary Assessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31 ENvTL. 
L. REp. 11,112, 11,121 (2001). 
177 See generally, e.g., Lawrence Berger, Public Use, Substantive Due Process and Takings-An 
Integration, 74 NEB. L. REv. 843 (1995); Edward]. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected 
through the Takings Clause: NoIlan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 Envtl. L. 155 (1995). 
178 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (regulatory takings cases "neces-
sarily entail[] complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of gov-
ernment actions"); Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127. In Penn 
Centra~ the Court observed that "a use restriction on real property may constitute a 'tak-
ing' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose ... or 
perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property." 438 U.S. at 
127 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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groundwater and damage private homes, is analogous to Rhode Is-
land's requirement that salt marshes be left intact, to provide ecologi-
cal support for water quality, fisheries, commercial and recreational 
activity, and private property values (including Palazzolo's). Salt 
marshes, even more than coal pillars, perform socially important 
functions that justify the impact on the private owner's profit margin. 
XI. THE LATEST WORD FROM THE SUPREME COURT: 
THE TAHOE-SIERRA DECISION 
On April 24, 2002, just as this article was being wrapped up, the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning AgencyP9 In an important vic-
tory for state and local land use agencies, as well as for protection of 
ecologically sensitive resources, the Court, by a six to three margin, 
rejected a categorical takings claim based on a thirty-two-month de-
velopment moratorium on property around Lake Tahoe.ISO A thor-
ough exploration of Justice Stevens' thoughtful majority opinion is 
beyond the scope of this piece, except to highlight those aspects of 
the decision with relevance to Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 
First, in recognizing the "unique beauty" and vulnerability of 
Lake Tahoe, the Tahoe-Sierra Court showed a keener appreciation for 
the role of government land use regulation than the Palazzolo Court. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Palazzolo made no mention of the eco-
logical importance of salt marshes or the irreparable harm that im-
proper development can do to the public interest and community 
values in such resources. In contrast, Justice Stevens emphasized these 
considerations: 
Lake Tahoe's exceptional clarity is attributed to the ab-
sence of algae that obscures the waters of most other lakes. 
Historically, the lack of nitrogen and phosphorous, which 
nourish the growth of algae, has ensured the transparency of 
its waters. Unfortunately, the lake's pristine state has deterio-
rated rapidly over the past 40 years; increased land develop-
ment in the Lake Tahoe Basin ... has threatened the "noble 
179 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
180 Id. at 1489. 
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sheet of blue water" beloved by [Mark] Twain and countless 
others.181 
133 
Second, and more substantively, the Court reaffirmed with gusto 
the "parcel as a whole" rule requiring that a takings claim be evalu-
ated in relation to the claimant's entire property, not just the re-
stricted portion.182 The claimants in Tahoe-Sierra argued that a regula-
tion that prohibits all economic use for any period of time constitutes 
a Lucas-type per se taking.183 The Court decisively rejected this at-
tempt to sever property into discrete "temporal segments. "184 Justice 
Stevens stated: 
Of course, defining the property interest taken in terms of 
the very regulation being challenged is circular. With prop-
erty so divided, every delay would become a total ban .... 
Petitioners' "conceptual severance" is unavailing because it 
ignores Penn Centrals admonition that in regulatory takings 
cases we must focus on "the parcel as a whole." .... 
An interest in real property is defined by the metes and 
bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the 
term of years that describes the temporal aspect of the 
owner's interest.185 
Although most observers believed this was always the law, com-
mentators have criticized the "parcel as a whole" rule, and the Court 
itself had expressed some doubts about it.186 In Palazzolo, Justice Ken-
181 Id. at 1471 (quoting the lower court opinion, Tahoe-Sierra Presl!T'vation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 1999), which, in turn, 
quotes MARK ]\vAIN, ROUGHING IT 169 (facsimile reprint of 1st ed., Hippocrene Books, 
n.d.) (1872». 
182Id. at 1481, 1483, 1484 & n.26. 
183 Id. at 1480. 
184 Id. at 1483. 
185 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 
1483-84 (2002) (citations omitted). 
186 See Lucas v S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); Richard A. Ep-
stein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 16-17 (1987). The Lucas Court 
stated: 
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural 
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation 
as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial 
use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has 
suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole. 
505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. 
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nedy noted this criticism, but declined to explore it.I87 The Tahoe-
Sierra decision resolves the uncertainty in favor of viewing the State's 
denial of the wetlands permit as "merely caus[ing] a diminution in 
value" of Palazzolo's "parcel as a whole. "188 
In support of its conclusion on the whole parcel issue, the Court 
drew a sharp distinction between takings claims based on physical in-
vasions and those based on restricting the use of private property.I89 A 
taking claim based on a physical occupation necessarily focuses on the 
portion occupied, but that has no bearing on the application of the 
whole parcel rule in the context of a regulatory use restriction.loo 
Finally, the Tahoe-Sierra decision recognizes the "reciprocity of 
advantage" that regulatory restrictions can provide.I91 Because the 
moratorium that was the subject in Tahoe-Sierra applied broadly to all 
property owners in the Lake Tahoe Basin, it was an equitable way to 
insure that the overall quality of the lake would be maintained for 
everyone's benefit. Similarly, owners of coastal property in Rhode Is-
land benefit from a prohibition on the filling of salt marshes, which is 
necessary to maintain the ecological health of Winnapaug Pond and 
the estuarine environment that makes the location so attractive for 
development. It is reasonable to assume that property values would 
decline in response to the degradation of these resources. "While 
each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, 
benefit from the restrictions that are placed on others. "192 
CONCLUSION 
While I do not agree with Anthony Palazzolo's takings claim, I 
admire his dogged efforts to fight for what he believes in. I wish our 
economic system did not force such hard choices on owners of envi-
ronmentally sensitive lands. In the economy of nature, the "highest 
and best use" of a salt marsh is a salt marsh. Only in the perverse 
world of market economics is a beach club worth more than salt 
marsh. 
187 533 U.S. 606, 631-32. 
188 See 122 S. Ct. at 1484. 
189 See id. at 1478-79 ("This longstanding distinction ... makes it inappropriate to treat 
cases involving physical takings as controlling precedent for the evaluation of a claim that 
there has been a 'regulatory taking,' and vice versa."); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606, 628-29 (2001). 
190 See Talwe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478-79. 
191 See ill. at 1489. 
1~ Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n v. Mahon, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987). 
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As a matter of law, Palazzolo does not have a valid takings claim 
because he lacks the fundamental predicate of a cognizable property 
interest under the laws of Rhode Island. As a matter of policy, one 
might wish for a more enlightened governmental approach that 
would actually encourage and reward individuals who forego devel-
opment in favor of restoring, maintaining, and enhancing important 
ecological resources. For the most part, our tax and fiscal policies 
tend to reward activities that degrade and exhaust natural re-
sources.193 We need to shift to policies that reward conservation of the 
earth's declining stock of natural capital. 
193 See generally PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING THE NEXT IN-
DUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (Back Bay Books 2000); DAVID MALIN ROODMAN, THE NATURAL 
WEALTH OF NATIONS: HARNESSING THE MARKET FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1998). 

